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Beyond Legal Realism?:
Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies,
and the Situation of Legal Scholarship
Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon*
INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH OF THE SOCIAL AND THE TURN TO CULTURE
Everywhere it seems that culture is in ascendance. More and more
social groups are claiming to have distinctive cultures and are demanding
recognition of their cultural distinctiveness. Identity politics has merged
with cultural politics, so that to have an identity one must now also have a
culture.' Those who fail to establish their culture risk having their "truth"
missed by the myriad of authorities--courts, admissions committees, draft
boards-whose judgments help determine life fates. As a result, it
sometimes seems as if almost every ethnic, religious, or social group seeks
to have its "culture" recognized, and for precisely this reason "the
cultural" itself has become a subject of political discourse to a much
greater extent than in the past. Yet despite the growing sense that culture
must be recognized, there is little consensus on what the boundaries of the
cultural are, let alone how to "read" it in any particular instance.2
Moreover, the backlash against the proliferation of cultures and
identities, and the "politics of recognition,"3 has been vehement.
* Austin Sarat is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at
Amherst College. He is a past President of the Law and Society Association and is currently President
of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities. Jonathan Simon is Professor of
Law at the University of Miami School of Law. The essays published in this issue were originally
presented at the Symposium on Law and Cultural Studies which was held at the Yale Law School
April 14-16, 2000. We are grateful for the generosity and support of Dean Anthony Kronman.
1. Joan Scott, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 3
(John Rajchman ed., 1995).
2. This paradox plays out in many fields of social and legal life today. One example is the
criminal law, where the cultural has increasingly appeared in debates over such issues as whether a
defendant was reasonable in believing her life was in danger for purposes of justifying the killing of
another. See SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: How POLITICS Is DESTROYING THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (1998).
3. CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (1994).
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Politicians declare "culture wars" in an effort to reassert both the meaning
and centrality of certain allegedly transcendent human values.4 Debates
about the meaning and significance of culture become arguments about
"civilization" itself, in which acknowledgment of cultural pluralism and its
accompanying decanonization of the "sacred" Western texts are treated as
undermining national unity, national purpose, and the meaning of being
"American." 5 Political contests are increasingly fought over values and
symbols, with different parties advancing competing cultural programs.6
With the decline of ideology as an organizing force in international
relations, culture seems to provide another vantage point from which to
understand new polarities.' In addition, the cache of the cultural is
increasingly resonant in public policy, where traditional goals like
reducing crime and poverty are giving way to cultural goals like reducing
the fear of crime, and eliminating the culture of dependency. The cultural
is the implicit and explicit space of intervention for popular new strategies
like "community policing"8 and "workfare,"9 which promise to address
objective problems by altering the attitudes and experiences of the subjects
of policing and welfare. Government and other formal organizations
believe that it is essential to have cultural strategies in order to govern
their employees and customers more effectively and manage their popular
images.
The twentieth century familiarized us with the idea of propaganda and
the fact that political forces needed to utilize mass communications in
order to realize their power. Today, however, the cultural has become
more than a supplement or a delivery vehicle; it is quite literally where the
action is.1" In today's academy, sociologists, political scientists, and
lawyers find themselves invoking "culture" at the expense of, or in
response to, an emerging crisis within their own master references, such as
"the social," "public opinion," and "law." The cultural, in short, has
become a stand-in for interpretive grids that can no longer be utilized
effectively. It has also emerged in the current retail boom in the United
4. See CULTURE WARS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Fred Whitehead ed., 1994).
5. For a discussion of these debates, see JAMES HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
6. See BEN J. WATTENBERG, VALUES MATTER MOST (1995); Theodore Caplow & Jonathan
Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, in 26 PRISONS CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 63 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
7. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993).
8. WILLIAM LYONS, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: REARRANGING THE POWER TO
PUNISH (1999).
9. NANCY ELLEN ROSE, WORKFARE OR FAIR WORK: WORKFARE, WELFARE, AND GOVERNMENT
WORK PROGRAMS (1995).
10. The recent advertising campaign for the new dollar coin is a noteworthy example of this. Who
would have thought that you would need to advertise money? In recognizing that even currency must
be given "currency," the Treasury Department affirmed how embedded the cultural has become in the
economic and the political.
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States, where the commodity nature of goods has been increasingly
acknowledged and marketed as such.1" Indeed, Etienne Balibar has
suggested that "culturalism" has become a central logic of late
capitalism. 12
One way to make sense of this turn to culture is to relate it to the
parallel decline of "the social" 13-a decline that has become equally
central to the logic of governance throughout Western societies. For more
than a century of "reform," which culminated in the "welfare state" of the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the liberal rationality of government associated
with laissez faire capitalism and methodological individualism was
generally reordered around the social as a terrain for positive knowledge
and effective governmental intervention. Until the end of the nineteenth
century, law remained the dominant form of expertise relevant to
government, relying on courts and legal constructs like sovereignty,
property, and contract to rationalize power. In the twentieth century, a new
body of expertise became a co-equal, if not dominant, partner to
governance. The space of legal constructs was colonized and occupied by
"facts" generated by social scientists. Law and government became
fundamentally concerned with the social, an engagement revealed (but not
defined by) exuberant promises to found a fully social law (legal realism,
sociological jurisprudence) or a fully social state (socialism).
Law and government came to rely heavily on the methodologies and
constructs of the social sciences in order to shape the exercise of
governmental power in areas as diverse as prisons, schools, and labor. The
social sciences likewise established themselves as important adjuncts to
governance in part through the mediation of law (and to a lesser degree
medicine). This was seen first in criminology, social work, and public
health, and later in almost every aspect of economic and general policy.14
Although legal studies never collapsed into pure policy studies, to a great
11. Consider the product designs and marketing of chains like Urban Outfitters and Old Navy.
12. ETIENNE BALIBAR, Is There a "Neo-Racism"?, in ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS 17 (Chris Turner trans., Verso 1993).
13. By "the social" we do not mean an abstract category of knowledge (distinguishable from the
biological or the psychological); rather, we mean the historical formation of a sector of expertise about
the causes of problems like crime and poverty, along with a set of institutions like charities, and
ultimately government bureaucracies, formed to address these problems. There is a growing scholarly
literature on the social in this sense. Some of the leading works include the following: JACQUES
DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon 1979); GIOVANNA
PROCACCI, GOUVERNER LA MISERE: LA QUESTION SOCIALE EN FRANCE 1789-1848 (1993); NIKOLAS
ROSE, THE POWERS OF FREEDOM (1999); and WILLIAM WALTERS, UNEMPLOYMENT AND
GOVERNMENT: GENEALOGIES OF THE SOCIAL (2000). The view that the social in this sense is dead or
dying at the turn of the twenty-first century was first stated in JEAN BAUDRILLARD, IN THE SHADOW
OF THE SILENT MAJORITIES OR "THE DEATH OF THE SOCIAL" (1983). See also Nikolas Rose, The
Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government, 25 ECON. & SOC'Y 327 (1996).
14. See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL
(1995); Robyn Stryker, Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for Social
Conflict, Order, and Change, 99 AM. J. SOC. 847 (1994).
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extent, its critical efficacy came from its relationships with governance. 15
Thus, whether we look to government policy, legal doctrine, or social
science, the residue of the era of social liberalism remains a powerful
fusion of law, social science, and government.
Today, however, after decades in which "social problems" set the
agenda of government, the social has come to be defined as a problem to
be solved by reconfiguring government.' 6 One of the most striking
features of our present situation is the general decline in confidence in
virtually every institution, reform movement, and program of knowledge-
gathering attached to the social. Social work, social insurance, social
policy, and social justice--once expected to be the engines of a more
rational and modem society-are today seen as ineffectual and incoherent.
Socialism, once taken to be a very real competitor with liberalism as a
program of modem governance, has virtually disappeared from the field of
contemporary politics. The social sciences (especially sociology), which
had become court sciences at the highest levels in the 1960s and 1970s,
are today largely absent from national government, and experiencing
internal drift and discontent. It is probably misleading and certainly
premature to speak of the "death of the social." Much of the apparatus of
the social remains in place and is likely to remain important. 17 Yet the
power of the social to lend a sense of overall coherence and direction to
politics, law, and scholarship has been mortally undermined, and patterns
of alternative state rationalities have become visible.
It would take a book of its own to describe transformations in the field
of legal studies associated with the decline of the social as a nexus of
governing. Nonetheless, it has become readily apparent that the shifting
engagement between legal studies and government has altered the
formation and deployment of legal knowledge at all levels. Consider how
much of modem constitutional theory and jurisprudence has been a
response to the expansion of the social liberal state. Likewise, the prestige
of empirical research has been tied up with the access that social and legal
scholars obtained as experimenters and expert consultants, helping to
administer state interventions into problems such as prisons, crime, gangs,
and urban poverty. 18 Even discourses that have offered a more critical
15. Austin Sarat& Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW& POL'Y 98 (1988).
16. This movement is most widely associated with right-wing neoliberal thinking, which views
the social as a virtual construction of expansionist government. On this theory, social problems are
presumed to disappear (or at least become invisible) when you downsize government. Yet as
demonstrated by the success of President Clinton in the United States and Prime Minister Tony Blair
in the United Kingdom, the right has no monopoly on this shift, which is better seen as a
reconfiguration rather than a downsizing of government. Nikolas Rose has usefully described this
emerging paradigm as advanced liberalism. See Rose, supra note 13; Jonathan Simon, Law After
Society, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 143 (2000).
17. See Rose, supra note 13; Simon, supra note 16.
18. That access has largely disappeared for prisons. See Jonathan Simon, The "Society of
Captives " in the Era of Hyper-Incarceration, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 285 (2000).
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view of the enterprise of social policy and social research have often been
promoted by exposing gaps between imagination and action created by
racism, patriarchy, and class privilege.19
The simultaneous rise in prestige of the cultural in politics, the academy,
and law is neither a surprise nor the result of a dangerous compromise
among these fields. Instead, it is a response to the destabilization of the
established linkages among the academic fields anchored to the social. In
making these claims, we do not mean to raise anxieties about the closeness
of knowledge and power; indeed, in the tradition of Foucault, we want to
call attention to precisely how productive this relationship has been.2"
Whether we like it or not, the practices of governance help set the agenda
for legal scholarship, regardless of whether legal scholars imagine
themselves as allies or critics of the policy apparatus.2" Indeed, for legal
scholarship to do its job, it must respond to changes in practices of
governance by realigning its scholarly practices and knowledge
paradigms. Thus, one thing at stake in the movement from society to
culture as a way of organizing social relations is the need for a
realignment which will make way for a more prominent and productive
engagement among cultural analysis, cultural studies, and law.22
Our aim here is to explore the implications of changing logics of
governance for interdisciplinary legal scholarship. Our claim is quite
simple: As the logics of governance in the late modem era turn from
society to culture, legal scholarship itself should turn from society to
culture as well, and more fully embrace cultural analysis and cultural
studies. We see cultural analysis and cultural studies less as competitors
against the multitude of intellectual programs already operating in (what
might be called) the post-realist legal landscape-including varieties of
realism, legal process, law and economics, critical legal studies, feminism,
and critical race theory-and more as valuable supplements to the altered
environment of the present. 23 We also believe that legal studies provide a
19. Austin Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistence
of a Research Tradition, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 23 (1985).
20. A striking example is the tradition of post-World War II empirical studies of criminal justice,
which was primarily supported by large, corporately funded foundations and later the government
itself, but which operated to expose the manifold failures of the existing institutions ofjustice in the
United States. As late as the late 1960s, a government commission would employ legal sociologist
Jerome Skolnick to study the causes of campus and urban civil disorders, producing a volume highly
critical of American institutions and government. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF
PROTEST (1969).
21. See Patricia Ewick, Robert Kagan & Austin Sarat, Legacies of Legal Realism: Social Science,
Social Policy, and the Law, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 1 (Patricia Ewick,
Robert Kagan & Austin Sarat eds., 1999).
22. See Susan Silbey, Making a Place for a Cultural Analysis of Law, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 39
(1992).
23. Cultural analysis is often associated with "softer" research traditions like feminist
jurisprudence and other critical legal studies, but the "harder" traditions like economics and rational
choice recently have found themselves grappling with the problem of the cultural as well. Here the
work of Robert Ellickson and Robert Cooter stands out. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law and
2001]
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crucial site of engagement for the broader movement of cultural analysis
and cultural studies. Much of the analytic power of cultural studies in
fields like literature and film studies has been to treat these discourses as
law-like in being constitutive of the social relations they might otherwise
seem merely to represent. In looking beyond the narrowly juridical to
show how novels, newspapers, and soap operas also help create the nation
as an imaginary community,24 cultural studies often reads back into these
narratives a model of law that is more rule-like, coherent, and functional
than that described by legal studies.25
The emergent "cultural turn" in legal studies is one we welcome and
have sought to participate in.26 Under the banner of privileging the
cultural, scholars have employed research strategies that emphasize
listening to the way ordinary people construct the law in their narratives
about themselves,27 listening to the way judges and law professors
construct law in their narratives,2 8 and reading the implicit norms that
govern personal choices and behavior.29 These are just a few of the ways
that the cultural has been invoked.
Today, it is especially important to look for ways to build common links
among the diverse knowledge strategies associated with the cultural, now
that some of the most polemical assumptions about the opposition between
rigorous empirical work and the cultural turn have passed. It is time to
explore the terrain of possibilities that might be opened up by a greater
Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996). Indeed, some have now argued that law and economics must take cultural
effects into account. See Cass Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637 (1998).
The success of these methods, their ability to provide compelling accounts of particular legal problems
or solutions, is endangered by the implausibility of the original picture of the individual as rational
actor. As they seek to establish a more robust framework, these disciplines necessarily take on features
of cultural analysis. Ironically, once methods based on economics and rational choice accept the
challenge of accommodating cultural influences in their models, they lose most of the advantages of
parsimony and objectivity that seemed to separate them from the softer research traditions. While at
the moment disciplines may appear divided by interest in the cultural, we predict that cultural analysis
will become part of the production of truth across a broad range of fields. Like public opinion,
victimization surveys, and standardized educational test scores, cultural knowledge will become part
of what any respectable discipline needs to explain.
24. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO
WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP (1997).
25. For an interesting example of this tendency, see Marjorie Garber, Cinema Scopes: Evolution,
Media, and the Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 121 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1998).
26. See LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
28. See PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999). For a discussion of Kahn's
contribution to cultural analysis of law, see Austin Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law
Schools, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 (2000).
29. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
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engagement between cultural analysis, cultural studies, and law.30 Such an
endeavor is particularly valuable at a moment when the emergence of the
cultural itself seems to be part of a fundamental change in the relationships
of knowledge and power tied to the decline of the social. All the
disciplines associated with law, governance, and the social face the
problem of negotiating the relationship of their own expertise to the new
forms of governmental authority, while managing the powerful legacy of
the social in their own constitution. In this sense, cultural studies is far
from a cheerleader for the rise of the cultural. Indeed, it has flourished in
disciplines like anthropology and literature, which have dealt with
"culture" as a key term for a long time; yet in these disciplines, cultural
studies is associated with work that is self-conscious about the problematic
status of culture.
In the next part, before introducing the essays that make up this special
issue, we briefly flesh out our claims about the value of engagement
between cultural analysis, cultural studies, and law. We first pursue a
comparison with legal realism by suggesting a somewhat different way of
conceptualizing that intellectual movement, and then explore the dilemma
of promoting cultural analysis of law at this particular time in the
academic and political life of the concept of culture.
I. UNPACKING THE CULTURAL BAGGAGE OF LEGAL REALISM
With the ascendancy of legal realism during the last two-thirds of the
twentieth century, both law and social science found themselves engaged
in the practical arts of governing to an extent barely imagined in the
preceding century.31 As the state came to reconfigure its approach to
governing around problems of the social, both law and social science were
invested with new resources and roles. Social and legal reform reached a
peak in the 1960s and 1970s, and not coincidentally, law and social
science were reaching their own peaks of prestige at the same time. In the
years since, both law and social science have produced a great deal of
internal criticism of the reform effort. Moreover, the current generation of
social science and legal scholars must contend with a "cultural
programming" that is increasingly constraining.32
30. Cultural analysis is a broader and more inclusive category that cultural studies. The former
emerges most prominently in anthropology and literary studies and emphasizes the interpretation of
symbolic processes and the analysis of beliefs and values. Cultural studies, while it has many
contemporary sources, is a variant of the neo-Marxist analysis of ideology and ideology formation. It
embeds the interpretation of symbolic processes, beliefs, and values in an examination of the material
conditions that shape the production, presentation, circulation, and consumption of mediated images
and information. In addition, cultural studies offers a self-conscious reflection on the conditions and
politics of producing knowledge both in the academy and elsewhere.
31. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK (1993); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1043-45 (1995).
32. Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for
2001]
7
Sarat and Simon: Beyond Legal Realism?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
One of the most significant features of this programming is the set of
imaginary boundaries of the social body-nation, race, gender, ethnicity,
sexuality, age, and class-within which the realist paradigm in both law
and social science are confined. Realist legal studies almost always
operate within a political body, usually the nation, although this body is
not often itself an object of realist analysis. The boundaries and exclusions
wrapped up in this national frame are made up not just of its political
borders, but also of its racial, cultural, and linguistic embodiments. When
U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin are stopped by customs agents near the
Mexican border of California, Arizona, or Texas, there is an evident
surplus to their political identity that is neither identical with, nor
protected by, citizenship in the political sense.33 A similar emphasis on
cultural citizenship seems to apply far from the border, or far from direct
questions of nationality, when African-American drivers are pulled over
by police almost anywhere along the infamous Interstate 95.34
Today, scholarship and politics increasingly confront breaches in this
imaginary order-such as globalization, the internet, identity politics, and
the risk society-for which the realist paradigm seems inappropriate.
Within legal studies, new scholarship has taken up race, space, and the
nation as imaginary communities,35 but so long as this scholarship is
treated as a new mode of realist discourse, it may continue to have little
effect on the great mass of legal thought.36 Even when mainstream legal
scholarship self-consciously looks beyond the national, the priority
remains on those topics and actors of greatest concern to Western nations,
such as copyright protection and trade in goods and services. In the
meantime, the transnational flows of labor, black market profits, and
the Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 709 (1998); Simon, supra note 16.
33. On the nature of this surplus, see Margaret Montoya, Border/ed Identities: Narrative and the
Social Construction of Legal and Personal Identities, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 129 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1995).
34. The highway that runs from Miami, Florida, to Maine has been labeled a drug corridor by law
enforcement for years. At various points along it, local, state, and sometimes federal agents have
sought to apprehend cars moving drugs or drug money. The result, it has been alleged, is the profiling
of black drivers who are pulled over with minimal or no legal justification in the hopes of winning
consent to search their cars. Even when no drugs are found, large sums of cash have been seized as
drug money. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE (1999).
35. E.g., DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948 (1998); IhN HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
36. A notable example is the hostility of the United States Supreme Court to the discussion of
global legal norms. The United States is increasingly alone among liberal systems in ignoring the force
of arguments from other legal systems. Justice Thomas recently criticized lawyers for a condemned
inmate for discussing international human rights law:
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional
tradition or in this Court's precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the
panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.
Indeed, were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for
proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.
Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 460 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
[Vol. 13:3
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refugees, which concern much of the Third World, tend to be ignored.
A second of legal realism's continuing constraints is precisely its
realism. The realism paradigm is limited by its assumptions about the
interpretive value of certain kinds of observations, namely the behavior of
formal legal actors, social forces, and institutions. The first wave of
realists entered into an alliance with practitioners of the fledgling social
sciences, absorbing a positivist epistemology with its emphasis on
counting and statistical analysis. 37 This epistemological link has proved
remarkably enduring. 38 Despite its academic success, the positivist frame
has been strained by transformations in our understanding of the
construction of subjectivity.
Post-realist legal studies, like much of the dominant social science
discourse of the post-World War II era, has largely ignored the problem of
the subject.39 This oversight has profound implications for our
understandings of power, since the exercise of power always has
subjective effects on its targets and observers. These include terror, sexual
arousal, admiration, and guilt. Often they are precisely the intended effects
of, but not infrequently they are also indicators of, long-term domination.
40
Yet in most legal studies, the breadth of interest in subjectivity extends
little beyond the rational actor of law and economics.41 Efforts to describe
the "unthought" or "unconscious" parameters of legal studies have hardly
begun. In addition, the new economy taking shape around the high
technology sector in the United States reflects the tremendously successful
cultural revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, with their emphasis on
personal satisfaction (paradigmatically sexual), intense experiences (once
37. See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979).
38. Today, some six or seven decades later, the elite law schools remain heavily invested in this
model of interaction with the social sciences. This remains true despite the fact that social sciences
themselves have evolved a far more complex set of research strategies.
39. When it inevitably has to explore the space of the subject in order to address the social-
psychological motivations that underlie realist assumptions about social action, the results are far less
persuasive or rigorous than the rest of the analysis. For an influential example of a study that raises the
problem of motivation and causation in legal and social change, see GERALD ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS MAKE SOCIAL CHANGE (1989). For an argument that this is the Achilles
heel of the project, see Jonathan Simon, The Long Walk Home to Politics, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 923,
933 (1992). For Rosenberg's critique of a more subject-centered analysis, see Rosenberg's review of
Michael McCann and McCann's rejoinder. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Positivism, Interpretivism, and the
Study of Law, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 435 (1996); Michael McCann, Causal versus Constitutive
Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being So Positive) 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 457 (1996).
40. The deployment of a new medicalized approach to defining and regulating homosexual
conduct in the twentieth century is a well-known example that has sparked a good deal of research
over the last two decades. This deployment has emphasized deviant subjects, rather than abhorrent
acts, and has invested great social significance in the distinctive subjectivity of the "homosexual." See
LES MORAN, THE HOMOSEXUAL(ITY) OF LAW (1996). The highly successful movement to protect the
civil rights of gay and lesbian people grew from this investment and its unintended effect of making
homosexual conduct a more powerful anchor for identity. On this phenomenon, see LISA KEEN &
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL (1998).
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drugs, now expensive trips to Nepal), and forms of interpersonal
transcendence (sexual, religious, group process). For legal studies to
address these revolutions, and effectively unpack the place of culture in
the new logics of governance, requires us to consider not only different
sites of analysis (poems, novels, letters), but wholly different strategies of
relating to data.
As we shall detail in the next part, cultural analysis and cultural studies
are well suited to aid post-realist legal discourses in accomplishing this
task by revealing the constraints of forms of knowledge production and
engagement with governance that have shaped the disciplinary space in
which post-realist discourses currently operate. Since its beginnings in
1950s British Marxism, cultural studies has long been concerned with the
unthought or unconscious mechanisms that underlie the central solidarities
of modem societies (e.g., nation, race, class, gender).4" Many of the
techniques used by cultural studies to pursue this uncovering, including
deconstruction, genealogy, psychoanalysis, Marxist dialectics, and
feminism, are already widely familiar in legal studies. Less familiar,
however, is the commitment to engage with the cultural imaginary and
unconscious as a factor in law.
Cultural studies has also long been attentive to the role of subjectivity in
history and the complex interpenetrations of power and subjectivity,43 to
what Richard Johnson has called "the subjective side of social relations."
Indeed, much of the corpus of cultural studies consists of tools for tracking
the production of subject positions, as well as a growing set of "case
studies" of the subjective history of power in modem liberal democracies.
Beyond methodological innovation, cultural studies can promote change
in legal studies by widening the moments of subjectivity that are even
considered in the analysis of law and legality. In addition, while legal
studies has shown a growing interest in popular culture, it remains
occasional, episodic, and isolated.45 Thus, few legal scholars writing on
rape or capital punishment would assume that it is relevant, let alone
essential to review the leading contemporary films that have imagined
these experiences; yet most would almost certainly consult the leading
Supreme Court opinions on those topics, even if their primary interest lay
elsewhere.46 Cultural analysis and cultural studies encourage such shifts in
42. See, e.g., Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, in CULTURE/POWERIHISTORY: A
READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 520 (Nicholas B. Dirks et al. eds., 1995).
43. Id.
44. Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?, 16 Soc. TEXT 38, 39 (1986).
45. Examples of this interest are found in LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John
Denvir ed., 1996); Les Moran, From Part Time Hero to Bent Buddy: The Male Homosexual as Lawyer
in Popular Culture, 18 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 3 (1998); and Alison Young, Murder in the Eyes of the
Law, 17 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 31 (1997).
46. But see Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and
Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, 11 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 153 (1999).
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II. HIGH RISK CONTACTS
For many inside legal studies, the crises we have ascribed to the social
liberal state and its effects on the production of legal knowledge are
experienced as a serious methodological weakening.47 For example, a
perceived decline in original empirical research is sometimes ascribed to
hostility toward science and social reform by younger scholars; yet it may
be equally a result of declining social reform activity and its attendant
reduction in opportunities for classic empirical "gap" research. Given this
sense of malaise, the entreaty to engage further with cultural analysis, let
alone cultural studies, will strike many as a high-risk endeavor.4 8 Indeed,
because cultural analysis and cultural studies often are identified with a
particularly intense form of boundary breaking-a challenge to givens
which regularly invoke the transgressive-one might rightly be skeptical
about whether a legal studies field that experiences itself as vulnerable in a
highly competitive academic universe would welcome the destabilizing
agendas and strategies associated with either cultural analysis or cultural
studies. To many, taking on cultural analysis and cultural studies seems
like accepting an invitation to enter into the intellectual equivalent of a
cocktail lounge, where they will be exposed to small talk, secondhand
smoke, and perhaps even worse.4 9
Various responses can be suggested. As Carol Weisbrod has recently
observed:
One relates to the point that law creates the conditions of culture to
some degree. Another notes that law, as a cultural product, may have
something in common with other cultural products. Still another
focuses on the point that while law is to some extent a mandarin text,
it is itself a subject of popular culture. °
As these suggestions indicate, a cultural analysis/cultural studies of law
not only helps to challenge traditional ideas of culture, it may also help to
advance new conceptions of law. Some of these conceptions may call
attention to the possibility that the proliferation of law in film, on
television, and in mass-market publications has altered and/or expanded
47. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 697 (1992).
48. But see Conclusion to Paul Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (2001) (arguing that legal scholars who analyze the culture of the bench and the
legal academy, rather than popular culture, promote freedom by placing "the self at risk").
49. For another analogy, see Peter Brooks, A Slightly Polemical Comment on Austin Sarat, 10
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 409 (1998) ("In the humanities, we have seen cultural studies become a kind of
hotel lobby where all disciplines can hang out, brought together by a self-satisfied discourse on the
implication of knowledge with power, on the marginal and the hegemonic.").
50. CAROL WIESBROD, EMBLEMS OF FEDERALISM (forthcoming 2001).
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the sphere of legal life itself. Moreover, they may push us to consider law
as a world of images whose power is not located primarily in their
representation of something exterior to the image, but is found in the
image itself.5" Almost a century ago, legal realists helped to put the study
of law in action on the agenda of legal scholars. Today, perhaps a cultural
analysis/cultural studies of law will help expand the terrain of learning
about law, open up new arenas for the exploration of law's power, for the
pursuit of justice around, and perhaps through, law, and for the
development of new understandings of the self's relation to the social. But
just as the emergence of realism provoked intense anxiety, so too the
emergence of cultural analysis and cultural studies arouses its own
distinctive concerns.
To understand those concerns and how to respond to them, it may be
helpful to deepen this comparison with legal realism. Like cultural
analysis and cultural studies, legal realism is not a single strand of work
with a deep conceptual unity, but rather describes several strands with a
family resemblance. 2 Like the former, legal realism has been both
assimilated and criticized as a moral danger. Both are relatively easy to
caricature. The canard about predicting the law by what judges eat for
breakfast continues to make legal realism seem both extremist and silly,
decades after most of legal studies adopted important realist innovations.
Likewise, such cultural studies icons as Judith Butler, Homi Bhabha, and
Andrew Ross are sometimes dismissed as self-inflating dilettantes who
use forceful rhetoric to replace substantive analysis,53 even as new
generations of scholars put their insights to productive use.
When we compare the anxieties associated with the cultural turn with
those aroused by legal realism, we have in mind those provoked by
innovations in the forms of knowledge recognized by legal discourse, and
the place of lawyers in practicing the arts of government. 5 From this
perspective, the main contribution of legal realism was not to introduce a
51. This claim is made by Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and
Mourning in The Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 3 (2000).
52. The diversity of legal realism is described by Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1152 (1985).
53. An example is the pillorying of Butler and Bhabha by a right-wing philosophy journal, The
Journal of Philsoophy and Literature, that awarded them a prize for unintelligibility. This story was
picked up uncritically by the news media, including National Public Radio. See Ron Grossman,
Honors are Dubious for Academics Winning Bad Writing Contest, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27,
1999, at 7C; John Leo, Tower ofPomobabble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 15, 1999, at 16.
55. The renewal of interest in realism and its meaning is itself evidence of the larger shift we
discuss here. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher m1, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas
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particular body of legal theory into the discursive universe of legal
scholars (although it gave rise to multiple and conflicting theoretical
expressions), but to position legal analysis with respect to new
technologies of knowledge (the behavioral sciences) and new forms of
governing (the progressive and later New Deal state).56 The old legal
science not only excluded the new knowledge from the high church of
legal analysis (post-realism would do that as well), but also purported to
ignore its existence, in the same way it ignored the burgeoning
administrative law created by the new modes of state power.57 Realism as
an academic revolution swept away the legal science positions, even if the
establishment that replaced legal science was far more conservative than
realism's vanguards. Cultural analysis and cultural studies may not prove
as threatening to the established order as realism was, but their
significance lies in the same direction: They position legal studies in
relation to new technologies of knowledge and power operating in the
aftermath of the social liberal state.
III. CULTURALISM, LAW, AND LATE MODERNITY
If Etienne Balibar is right that the cultural is all over the place-as a
privileged source of knowledge, a crucial level on which to govern
effectively, and a commodity in the market-and that culturalism is a
dominant logic of late capitalism (and one might easily add or replace that
with late modernity), then we should not be surprised that the cultural is
already emergent in legal studies. Under these circumstances, the question
is whether, in the midst of this cultural turn, legal studies can make the
status of the cultural a theoretical problem for itself, and whether such an
enterprise is critical to gaining an "empirical" understanding of the legal
life of late modernity.
As we take on these questions, it is important to recognize that the
ascendance of the cultural comes paradoxically at a time when scholars
have increasingly begun to contest the concept of culture and recognize its
troubling vagueness. Talking about culture at the start of the twenty-first
century means venturing into a field where there are almost as many
definitions of the term as there are discussions of it,58 and where
56. BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
57. Herbert Wechsler makes this point in explaining that the Columbia of his law student days in
the late 1920s was transformed by realism even though its new Dean, Young B. Smith, was the
candidate of the conservatives and many of the most ardent realists had left Columbia for Yale and the
new program at Hopkins. See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles " in the
Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 861 (1993).
58. An earlier version of the following pages appeared in Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams, The
Cultural Lives of Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra note 25, at 1. While we
acknowledge the difficulty of disciplining the concept of culture, we do not agree with those who
believe it to be analytically useless. For examples of such claims, see Mary Douglas, The Self-
Completing Animal, TIMES LITERARY SuPp., Aug. 8, 1975, at 886 (writing, of the concept of culture,
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arguments rage inside as well as outside the academy. 9 In recent years, as
we noted above, these arguments have come to play a progressively more
visible role in our national life and in universities.6" There the history,
meaning, and utility of culture as a category of analysis in the humanities
and social sciences are all up for grabs.62 Where once the analysis of
culture could neatly be assigned to the respective disciplines of
anthropology or literature, today the study of culture refuses disciplinary
cabining and forges new interdisciplinary connections.63 Thus, we should
resist the temptation to treat battles over academic curricula, federal arts,
and museum programming as penumbras of some deeper social conflict.
They represent their own conflicts, which are equally fundamental.
Traditionally, the study of culture was the study of "'that complex
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."64
This definition, in addition to being hopelessly vague and inclusive,
treated culture as a thing existing outside of ongoing local practices and
social relations. In addition, by treating culture as "capabilities and habits
acquired," this conception made culture into a set of timeless resources to
be internalized in the "civilizing" process through which persons were
made social. Finally, culture was identified as containing a kind of
inclusive integrity, parts combining into a "whole." This conception of
culture still has its defenders and may even be on the rise as a political
knowledge.6 5
that "never was a fluffy notion at large ... since the singing angels blew the planets across the
medieval sky or ether filled the gaps of Newton's universe"); and Stephen Greenblatt, Culture, in
CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 225, 225 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds.,
1990) ("Like 'ideology' (to which, as a concept, it is closely allied) 'culture' is a term that is
repeatedly used without meaning much of anything at all, a vague gesture toward a dimly perceived
ethos.").
59. As Renato Rosaldo puts it, "These days questions of culture seem to touch a nerve." RENATO
ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOcIAL ANALYSIS, at ix (1989).
60. See GERALD GRAFF, PROFESSING LITERATURE: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1987).
62. As Robert Brightman writes, "The recent critics of culture in no respect comprise an intemally
homogeneous block, and the objections currently in play represent a complex skein of partially
discrete, partially convergent influences from political economy, modernist and postmodernist
anthropologies, varieties of feminist writing, cultural studies, and diverse other sources." Robert
Brightman, Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Reflexification, 10 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 509 (1995).
63. Annette Weiner notes about the discipline of anthropology and its relation to the idea of culture
that "[t]oday... 'culture' is increasingly a prized intellectual commodity, aggressively appropriated
by other disciplines as an organizing principle." Annette Weiner, Culture and Our Discontents, 97
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 15 (1995).
64. Edward B. Tylor quoted in Greenblatt, supra note 55, at 225.
65. The fashionableness in recent years of speculating about the cultural deficits of the poor, and
liberalism's role in worsening them, speaks to this.
[Vol. 13:3
14
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol13/iss1/1
Sarat & Simon
Today, however, critiques of the traditional, unified, reified, civilizing
idea of culture abound within the academy.66 Indeed, it is now almost
imperative to write (to quote Lila Abu-Lughod's influential essay)
"against culture,"" or, in the face of these critiques, to "forget culture." 69
Thus, in his study of a suit filed by the Mashpee Indians of Cape Cod in
1977, James Clifford examines the way culture stood up in a context
where the very idea of cultural authenticity was on trial. According to
Clifford, culture
was too closely tied to assumptions of organic form and
development. In the eighteenth century culture meant simply "a
tending toward natural growth." By the end of the nineteenth century
the word could be applied not only to gardens and well-developed
individuals but to whole societies .... [T]he term culture retained its
bias toward wholeness, continuity, and growth. Indian culture in
Mashpee might be made of unexpected everyday elements, but it had
in the last analysis to cohere, its elements fitting together like parts of
a body. The culture concept accommodates internal diversity and an
"organic" division of roles but not sharp contradictions, mutations, or
emergences.... This cornerstone of the anthropological discipline
proved to be vulnerable under cross-examination.7 °
Culture, he concludes, is "a deeply compromised idea.... Twentieth-
century identities no longer presuppose continuous cultures or
traditions. 71 Or, as Luhrmann observes, the concept of culture is "more
unsettled than it has been for forty years. "72
In this unsettled moment in the life of the concept of culture efforts are
underway to rehabilitate and reform it. Contemporary cultural studies has
played an especially important role in these efforts.73 Cultural studies has
had a bracing impact in giving new energy and life to the study of culture,
freeing it from its homogenizing and reifying tendencies. It has done so by
radically extending what counts as culture beyond the realm of "high
culture. '74 It invites study of the quotidian world. Film, advertising, pop
art, contemporary music, and other products of "popular culture" have
66. For a particularly useful summary of these critiques, see Brightman, supra note 58, at 509.
67. Lila Abu-Lughod, Writing Against Culture, in RECAPTURING ANTHROPOLOGY: WORKING IN
THE PRESENT 137 (1991).
69. See Brightman, supra note 58, at 509.
70. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY,
LITERATURE, AND ART 323, 338 (1988).
71. Id. at 10, 14.
72. T.M. Luhrmann, Review of Hermes' Dilemma and Hamlet's Desire: On the Epistemology of
Interpretation, 95 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1058 (1993).
73. See CULTURAL STUDIES (Lawrence Grossberg et al. eds., 1992).
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been legitimized as objects of study.75
In addition to this liberating expansion in the objects of study, cultural
studies has linked the study of culture to questions of social stratification,
power, and social conflict. "[C]ultural processes," as Johnson notes,
are intimately linked with social relations, especially with class
relations and class formations, with sexual division, with the racial
structuring of social relations.... [C]ulture involves power and helps
produce asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups
to define and realize their needs. And... culture is neither an
autonomous nor externally determined field, but a site of social
differences and struggles.76
Thus culture, Johnson continues, can be understood as "historical forms of
consciousness or subjectivity, or the subjective forms we live by." 77
Law and legal studies are relative latecomers to cultural analysis and
cultural studies.78 As Robert Post explains,
We have long been accustomed to think of law as something apart.
The grand ideals of justice, of impartiality and fairness, have seemed
to remove law from the ordinary, disordered paths of life. For this
reason efforts to unearth connections between law and culture have
appeared vaguely tinged with expos6, as though the idol were
revealed to have merely human feet. In recent years, with a firmer
sense of the encompassing inevitability of culture, the scandal has
diminished, and the enterprise of actually tracing the uneasy
relationship of law to culture has begun in earnest.
79
In the last thirty years, however, legal scholars have come to attend to
the cultural lives of law, first with the development of critical legal
studies, then with the growth of the law and literature movement, and
more recently with the growing attention to legal consciousness and legal
ideology in sociolegal studies.8" Fueled in part by Clifford Geertz's
description of law as "a distinctive manner of imagining the real," 1 they
have begun to attend to the imaginative life of the law and the way law
lives in our imagination. Law, as Geertz suggested, is not "a mere
75. See STEVE REDHEAD, UNPOPULAR CULTURES: THE BIRTH OF LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE
(1995).
76. Johnson, supra note 44, at 39.
77. Id. at 43.
78. But see STUART HALL ET. AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND
ORDER (1978).
79. Robert Post, Introduction to LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE, at vii. (Robert Post ed., 1991).
80. See Sibley, supra note 22; see also Anthony Chase, Historical Reconstruction in Popular Legal
and Political Culture, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1969 (1994); Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory
of Popular Culture, 1986 WiS. L. REV. 527; Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The
Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 185 (1987);
Symposium, Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L. J. 1545 (1989).
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technical add-on to a morally (or immorally) finished society[; it] is, along
of course with a whole range of other cultural realities ... an active part
of it."'82 Treating law as a cultural reality means looking at the material
structure of law to see it in play and at play, as signs and symbols,
fantasies and phantasms8 3
In the tradition of cultural studies, cultural analysis of law rejects "the
dichotomy between agency and structure .... Treating consciousness as
historical and situational, cultural analyses also shift attention to the
constitution and operation of social structure in historically specific
situations."84 It insists on examining the ways that the cultural lives of law
contribute to what Johnson calls "asymmetries in the abilities of
individuals and social groups to define and realize their needs."85 Cultural
study of law connects the symbolic and material by resisting their
dichotomization. As Silbey puts it, "[L]aw does more than reflect or
encode what is otherwise normatively constructed ... [It] is part of the
cultural processes that actively contribute in the composition of social
relations."86 Law is part of the everyday world, contributing powerfully to
the apparently "stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world and to the
generally shared sense that as things are, so must they be."87
Cultural analysis and cultural studies suggest that law operates largely
by influencing modes of thought, rather than determining conduct in any
specific case. It enters social practices, and is "imbricated" in them,
shaping consciousness and making asymmetries of power seem, if not
invisible, then natural and benign. Law is, in this sense, constitutive of
culture, "a part of the cultural processes that actively contribute in the
composition of social relations."88
Cultural analysis insists, however, on the significance of agency.
Though law's "demands" tend to seem natural and necessary (hardly like
demands at all), we are not merely the inert recipients of law's external
pressures. In this way, the cultural lives of law, as Peter Fitzpatrick
contends, have been central "in the scaffolding of the modem-nation
state," with its construction of the rights-bearing subject, imagined social
contract, and insistence on boundaries and boundedness8 9 Legal meanings
are not, however, invented and communicated in a unidirectional process.
Litigants, clients, consumers of culture, and others bring their own
82. Id. at 218.
83. For a general discussion of the materiality of cultural life, see RAYMOND WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS
IN MATERIALISM AND CULTURE: SELECTED ESSAYS (1980).
84. Silbey, supra note 22, at 47.
85. Johnson, supra note 44, at 39.
86. Silbey, supra note 22, at 41.
87. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Across the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAw IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 30 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
88. Silbey, supra note 22, at 41.
89. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 202 (1992).
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understandings to bear9 ; they deploy and use meanings strategically to
advance interests and goals. They press their understandings in and on
law, and, in doing so, invite adaptation and change in legal practices. Law
thus exists as what Raymond Williams calls "moving hegemony."92
The priority of the cultural in late modern societies also raises the
salience of law as an object of study. Most social relations are permeated
with law. Long before we ever think about going to a courtroom, we
encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel
guests-roles that already embed a variety of juridical notions. The hyper-
mediated quality of communities established under the conditions of late
modern life embeds law at an even more molecular level because the very
flesh of those communities-the bandwidths of the broadcast world, the
networks of cable and phone lines known as the internet-come to us
already legally processed to a great degree. 93
Law has played, and continues to play, a large role in regulating the
terms and conditions of cultural production.94 Cultural analysis and
cultural studies call on scholars to attend to this role. The regime of
copyright, to take a prominent example, has protected and promoted
certain kinds of expression and discouraged others; it has tethered the life
of signs to the fortunes of capital, contributing importantly to the linkage
of artistic value with ideas of originality, authenticity, and "ownership of
the image." 95 Through doctrines of "personality rights," law "authors the
celebrity" and, in so doing, gives a particular shape to the practices of
"popular culture."96 In such a setting, even those forms of cultural analysis
91. See Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness
of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); see also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE
PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 37 (Steven Rendell trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1984); JON CRUZ &
JUSTIN LEWIS, VIEWING, READING, LISTENING: AUDIENCES AND CULTURAL RECEPTION (1994).
92. Williams defines hegemony as "a complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural forces"
that sustains particular forms of inequality and domination. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND
LITERATURE 112 (1977). This concept, Barbara Yngvesson explains, allows us to recognize the
"coexistence of discipline and struggle, of subjection and subversion and directs attention toward a
dynamic analysis of what it means to be caught up in power." Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in
Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1693 (1989).
93. Rosemary Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law, in LAW IN
THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra note 25, at 38.
94. See JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991).
95. See BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST THEORY OF
LAW (Elizabeth Kingdom trans., Routledge 1979); MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS (8th ed. 1989); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L. J. 455.
96. Rosemary Coombe, Author/izing The Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and
Unauthorized Genders, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW
AND LITERATURE 101 (Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); see also Harold Gordon,
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553 (1960); Joan
Gross, The Right of Publicity Revisited: Reconciling Fame, Fortune, and Constitutional Rights, 62
B.U. L. REV. 986 (1982).
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and cultural studies that remain anchored in literature or cinema or music
must move beyond treating them as metaphors of legality. Novels and
newspapers are not simply analogous to legal acts, but their operation, the
way they circulate, are questions of law.
Cultural study of law is important, then, as a way of unpacking what
Rosemary Coombe calls "the signifying power of law and law's power
over signification." 97 It invites us to acknowledge that legal meaning is
found and invented in the variety of locations and practices that comprise
culture, and that those locations and practices are themselves
encapsulated, though always incompletely, in legal forms, regulations, and
symbols. Thus, reading everyday cultural forms is a complex interpretive
task.
The essays collected in this special issue take on the topic of culture in
spite of its vagueness. An outgrowth of the Symposium on Law and
Cultural Studies held at the Yale Law School in April 2000, this volume
brings together work from within the field of cultural studies and the
broader movement to foster a cultural study of law. It is, however, neither
a comprehensive overview of the ways law shapes culture and culture
shapes law, nor a survey of cultural approaches to law. Instead it provides
a sampling of significant theoretical issues in the cultural analysis of law
and illustrates some of those issues in provocative examples of that genre.
It is designed as an encouragement in the still tentative efforts to forge a
new interdisciplinary synthesis, a cultural studies of law.
What would legal studies look like if they were to embrace cultural
analysis and/or cultural studies? How does a cultural study of law enlarge
and alter our conception of the way law lives in and through our identities,
interpretations, and imaginings? Can the intellectual strategies of cultural
analysis and cultural studies be disciplined and made serviceable as
vehicles for the analysis of legal phenomena? Can cultural studies be put
into productive dialogue with other forms of cultural analysis, or will such
dialogue diminish the significance of both as forces in legal scholarship?
These are the questions that this collection of essays addresses. Doing so
at this point in the development of cultural study and legal study is indeed
daunting, since the richness and plurality of the former is now as great as
it has ever been, and legal scholarship is as open as it has ever been to
interdisciplinary interests. But, as we have tried to show, the separation of
legal study and cultural analysis, in all its variety, is increasingly costly at
this time in the history of the rationalities of governance. Maintaining such
a separation means overlooking the objects to which empirical methods
97. Coombe, supra note 67, at 61.
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need to be applied if we are to maintain any hope of getting purchase on
the role of law in contemporary society.
This volume seeks to overcome that separation and elaborate a cultural
analysis of legal life. Yet the essays collected here march under no single
programmatic banner. Each speaks in its own voice; each brings its own
perspective to bear in talking about, or performing, a cultural analysis of
law. Together they exemplify the kinds of contributions that cultural
analysis and cultural studies make to interdisciplinary legal study, even as
they highlight points of contest between cultural studies and its allied
forms of scholarship. Together they help reposition legal study in response
to the death of the social and the rise of the cultural in the governance of
late modern societies.
The first section-Approaches to the Cultural Study of Law-contains
four essays, each exemplifying a distinctive approach to the cultural study
of law. The juxtaposition of these perspectives maps the terrain which
cultural analysis/cultural studies might traverse. This section begins with
Naomi Mezey's effort to identify the contribution of cultural analysis to
legal studies at a time when, as she notes, "culture is everywhere invoked
and virtually nowhere explained." She describes the pervasive invocation
of culture as a fact of late modern life, calling our attention to the
explanations of the shootings at Columbine High School, which made
reference to a "culture of violence," or to the Juvenile Justice Bill recently
debated in Congress, which would have allowed schools to post the Ten
Commandments in classrooms in an effort to combat youth crime.
Quoting the critic Adam Gopnik, Mezey observes, "'Every age has a term
to explain things that resist explanation. The Elizabethans had Fate; the
Victorians had History; we have Culture."'
In light of the pervasiveness of culture as an explanation for social
problems and a strategy of governance, Mezey argues that we need to
pursue a "cultural interpretation of law"-even at a time in which the
status of culture is problematic. What, Mezey asks, would such an
interpretation do? First, it would give culture some definition, however
provisional. Culture, in Mezey's view, is any shared set of signifying
practices through which "meaning is produced, performed, contested, or
transformed." Second, a cultural interpretation would require us to attend
to the way law orders meanings, and to the "slippage" that almost
inevitably accompanies its efforts to do so. Mezey calls attention to such
quotidian practices as the way gay men in California pay someone's
highway tolls to try to "pick up" other gay men, and the way students in
California wear Oakland Raiders football jackets to signify gang
affiliation. In her analysis, she alerts us to the ways the significations
change in the face of legal regulations.
The work of cultural interpretation, Mezey argues, will never have the
parsimony of law and economics and will, as a result, struggle to find a
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place in the legal academy. Yet its complexity is precisely its virtue. And
to neglect cultural interpretation in favor of other kinds of scholarship is to
shirk our responsibility as scholars: to make sense of the pervasiveness of
culture as a category through which events in our world are now so
frequently described and explained.
A similar sense of the ethical and political imperative of cultural
analysis of law informs the next contribution. This essay claims that
cultural studies is a preferred style or type of cultural analysis, precisely
because of its engagement with, and attentiveness to, the political
struggles of our era. Toby Miller provides a definition and overview of
cultural studies as well as an example of the kind of work Mezey
advocates. His example is drawn from a real world struggle in which he
was involved, namely the effort of graduate students to unionize at New
York University. Through an examination of that effort, Miller highlights
what happens at the intersection between legal institutions (in this case,
the National Labor Relations Board) and cultural practices (specifically,
what he sees as the exploitation of graduate students by research
universities). The struggle to unionize, argues Miller, reminds us that
cultural studies itself signifies an academic commitment to "progressive
social change."
Miller's essay contains a genealogy of cultural studies that calls
attention to its multigenerational, multinational origins and lays out a
series of understandings of culture. Some of these serve the needs of social
reproduction and others, he claims, promote contestation and social
transformation. At the heart of the difference between these conflicting
uses of cultural analysis, Miller argues, is a controversy over the viability
of "historical materialism." In the face of new rationalities of governance,
he claims that scholars must now bring together cultural studies and what
he calls "critical political economy." His object is to politicize theory and
theorize politics. The cultural analysis of law should use the method of
historical materialism to contribute to an understanding of "the
reproduction of culture through structural determinations on subjects
versus their own agency."
Miller shows what such an analysis might look like in his description of
the struggles of graduate students at N.Y.U. In doing so, he notes the
contradictory position of university officials who, in the name of
maintaining a democratic university, oppose the effort to democratically
determine whether graduate students wish to bargain collectively under
the auspices of a union. He also explores the difficulty of speaking to and
through law, represented here by the National Labor Relations Board.
Throughout his essay, Miller exposes the complicity between the politics
of discursive practices and the political economy of university life.
While Miller's genealogical and critical narrative exemplifies the kind
of work that Mezey seeks to encourage, this narrative becomes an
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(unnamed) object of critique in the essay by Paul Berman. Miller's style of
work relies on what Berman, borrowing from Paul Ricoeur, calls the
"hermeneutics of suspicion." Such an approach to cultural study seeks to
"unmask, demystify, and expose the real from the apparent." It is
relentlessly critical, seeing power and domination everywhere. Berman
faults such an approach on two grounds. First, it situates the analyst in a
superior position to the object of study. By unmasking ideologies and
power dynamics, "the writer implies that he or she is able to get beyond
the mystification and see the situation more accurately than those caught
'within' the system." Second, and more importantly, the hermeneutics of
suspicion has, in Berman's view, a "corrosive effect on our psyches and
society as a whole," leading us to despair of the prospect of social change
through law.
Berman advocates "sympathetic reading," which identifies "what is
worthwhile in the efforts of people to construct ideas, systems, or
principles." He would fault Miller for not being more empathetic toward
the university administrators he describes, and Miller's form of cultural
studies for not telling stories of "beauty, optimism, noble efforts, hope."
Moreover, Berman believes that law provides a powerful institutional
home for a view of culture that is both dynamic and tolerant. He urges
scholars not to turn away from projects of reform, but to tell stories that
envision law "not merely as an instantiation of embedded power, but as an
activity that might have true intellectual, imaginative, ethical, and political
value."
Paul Kahn's work is directly critical of Berman's embrace of reform as
a touchstone for, or object of, the cultural analysis of law. Such an
approach, Kahn contends, treats the study of law as if it were the practice
of law. For Kahn, Berman's call to reform exemplifies the powerful
influence that law schools exercise over the ways that law is studied. Law
schools, Kahn argues, hold all forms of scholarship to a pragmatic,
instrumentalist test, evaluating them in terms of their utility for policy.
"The modern law school," he says, "lives within this burden of
establishing the form of knowledge appropriate to law." Kahn wishes to
distance himself from that conception of what a cultural analysis of law
must be.
Yet he also wishes to distance himself from Miller's version of cultural
studies, which emphasizes popular, resistant practices, and views law as a
set of "sites of social conflict, and resources ... for those involved in
conflict." In contrast, Kahn focuses on the top of the legal hierarchy, on
the beliefs and self-conceptions of those who produce law. Studying that
group reveals, Kahn argues, that the language of law's rule is our
dominant language of political legitimacy. The task of cultural analysis
should be to offer a "phenomenology of this distinctive American political
culture of the rule of law." What is the world that is imagined in that
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culture? How is that world contested by other symbolic forms?
Cultural analysis of law depends, Kahn argues, on distanced,
disinterested analysis, because it seeks to promote a conception of
freedom informed by an understanding of the cultural presuppositions that
guide our practices. Rather than pursuing projects of reform, Kahn turns
cultural analysis on his own beliefs. "Bringing cultural study into the
heartland of the legal academy is," Kahn concludes, "a way of putting the
self at risk" and making the self, rather than the other, the subject of
inquiry.
The three essays that make up the next section-Deploying Law and
Legal Ideas in Culture and Society-identify moments of coincidence and
conflict between legal and cultural practices, and chart the significance of
moments when law comes to culture and culture comes to law. They show
that while law may be part of a larger "culture," the latter is not a "system"
in which law plays a consistent role across all contexts. In our culture, no
one would mistake a poem for a court's judgment, but neither would a
jurisdictional hierarchy place law above or below poetry. Indeed, much of
the work involved in producing culture and law lies in managing the
boundaries between them, a game played with often ruthless seriousness
by judges and lawyers. But at the same time, law is always already
thoroughly and irreversibly infected by the (often dated) cultural content
of its own objects. This puts all of the authors in this section in the
difficult position of explicating connections between law and culture,
while working from other points of contact between the two.
Carol Greenhouse uses the encounter between cultural studies and legal
studies to confront the deep cultural connections among law, social
science, and post-World War II American liberalism. The latter is now
canonized in the landmark civil rights and civil liberties victories of the
1950s and 1960s. According to Greenhouse, the social movements of that
period, especially the Civil Rights Movement, produced both a
"pragmatics of reform," which animated public discourse in that era, and a
"poetics of citizenship," which helped shape and define a way of
imagining America.
What remains of that era are deep but often hidden connections between
the reform agenda of postwar liberalism, on the one hand, and
ethnography and literature, on the other. These connections are welded
together by the force of the Civil Rights Movement. During the 1980s and
1990s, as the public influence of civil rights waned, and the United States
Congress and courts turned hostile to the civil rights agenda, the liberal
project became more associated with literature, the arts generally, popular
culture, and the academy. This new relationship constitutes, for
Greenhouse, the cultural conditions of neo-liberalism.
Literature and ethnography remain influential ways of imagining the
United States as a national community that is paradoxically made up of
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autonomous local communities. Novels by African-American women
shaped directly by participation in the Civil Rights Movement, such as
those by Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, have been best sellers, even as
the electorate has unashamedly rejected many of the legislative victories
of the Movement itself. While ethnography is read by a much smaller
audience, there is a lively discourse of "community studies" focused very
much on the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, i.e., the fate of the
inner city "ghettos" and their successor communities of the very poor and
the ethnically or racially marginalized. Both literature and ethnography
operate in the thrall of the now-absent Civil Rights Movement. Thus,
while many critics of the cultural turn in the American academy see it as
an abandonment of engagement with power, Greenhouse shows that even
in the cultural camp, the unexamined relationship to liberalism, and its
current crisis, continues to haunt the academy.
Greenhouse offers an internal critique of American ethnography aimed
at reestablishing its dialogue with the fading liberalism of the mid-
twentieth century and the emerging neo-liberalism of the turn of the
twenty-first century. At the core of both post-Civil Rights literature and
American ethnography, she contends, is the relationship of the "national
community"-embodied in the federal government, its agencies, and
sometimes in the narrators of the texts-to a local community, which is
defined as singular, yet quintessentially American. In part, ethnographic
discourse was produced to make local communities available to the gaze
of the federal government, whose claims to power presumed direct access
to the local.9" Ethnography has continued in this mode since the 1970s
despite the dismantling of much of the liberal governmental project. In its
current form it constitutes a kind of nostalgic program. Greenhouse
suggests that if social-legal studies and ethnography are to have a more
critical role in the shaping of neo-liberal governance, they must revisit
their cultural background, reposition themselves with respect to those
movements now shaping the cultural life of law, and pursue a new
ethnography of American communities, one attentive to postcolonialism,
globalization, and transnationalism.
The next essay in this section operates on a similar terrain, exploring
law's relationship to its narrative others. Here the other is the science of
the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Whereas the
social sciences taken up in Greenhouse's essay directly competed and
cooperated with law in a visible struggle to shape governance, the traces
of natural science that Dimock explores operated in the imagination of
legal academics who sought to define their own status as producers of
98. The famous "maximum feasible participation" formula of the 1960s "war on poverty" was
only one instance of this pattern of federal power, which has existed since the 1930s. See DANIEL
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expertise (academic law). It is this expertise, in part, that helped form the
civil rights coalition Greenhouse describes.
Since the nineteenth century (at the latest), those seeking to recast law
as a practice and body of knowledge have repeatedly invoked the model of
science. Christopher Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School and inventor
of the influential "case-method," described his goal as moving law from a
craft to a science where the law library with its collection of judicial
opinions would play the same role that the laboratory, the museum of
natural history, and the botanical garden played for other disciplines in the
university setting. Early in the twentieth century, Roscoe Pound (another
Harvard Dean and promoter of what he called "sociological
jurisprudence"), and a bit later the legal realists at Columbia and Yale,
rejected Langdell's approach as a form of mysticism and promoted their
own scientific vision of legal studies as an empirical approach to law. As
Dimock carefully shows, these invocations of science have often been
strikingly distant from actual scientific practices. Thus Langdell invoked
the logical analysis of written texts as the model of science at a time when
the physical and life sciences were increasingly experimental. Even the
realists, who allied themselves with the empirical social sciences emerging
in the same period, ignored real differences between the normative
objectives of legal argument and the descriptive practices of social
science.
It is not only law, however, that has engaged in a systematic
misrecognition of its relationship to science. Science also has a metaphoric
relationship to law, especially in the notion of a "law of science." The
standard self-description of science emphasizes the discovery of
"universal laws," i.e., generalizations that apply across time and place.
Dimock shows that the notion of the universe as "law abiding" is itself a
highly selective gloss of the sciences. Some sciences, like physics, do
seem to move from empirically observed regularities to the discovery of
law-like rules that apply everywhere and always. Yet most scientific work
may ironically be closer to the contingent predictions that lawyers give.
The life sciences especially deal with phenomena in which so many
factors, including contingency, come to bear, that universal laws are rarely
if ever described.
What law and most of the sciences actually share is a vulnerability to
the diachronic processes, history and time, which the metaphorical
conception of law in both jurisprudence and science rarely acknowledges.
This may be most critical in those areas where law and science interact in
practice rather than speak about each other through metaphor. Dimock
develops an important example of this point in the field of intellectual
property. The legal enforcement of "patents," authorized in the United
States Constitution itself, permits successful investigators to limit access
to their inventions and discoveries, subordinating scientific development
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to the interests and whims of the patent holder. Yet the idea of patentable
discovery held by the Framers of the Constitution was far more limited
than the discoveries that courts regularly recognize today.
This latter analysis shows what cultural studies might look like if it
sought to describe and interpret the cultural exchange between practices
like law and science. Such an interpretation would be attentive to the
diachronic stories often implicit in the constellations of discourse and
practice that students of cultural studies produce. Most scholarship,
according to Dimock, attends solely to structural patterns that link
developments at any time among different institutional fields. The hard
work of history carried out in terrains not preordained by political
categories such as nation and language is all too often left undone.
In the next essay, Peter Brooks looks at a one particular point of contact
between law and a form of scientific expertise, therapy, focusing
particularly on the production of knowledge from recovered memory.
Recovered memory is only the most recent of a series of flashpoints
between law and what Nikolas Rose calls the "psy" experts, which go
back well into the nineteenth century, if not earlier.99 Indeed, recovered
memory emerges at a time when, quite unlike the turn of the last century,
the role of knowledge of the human psyche has been in general retreat
from the courtroom. Few today would share Roscoe Pound's expectations
that modern law would inevitably become a branch of human science. 100
In Brooks's view, the recent trend to produce cultural analysis of law
runs into the power of law both to exclude and to domesticate other
narratives and forms of expertise. The recovered memory cases should be
particularly troubling to law because the very facts underlying the cause of
action (often incestuous sexual abuse as a child) are produced through the
work of therapy. Courts follow what Brooks considers a familiar pattern,
admitting the claims while keeping out the therapeutic experts. Recovered
memory is admitted because it is memory, but the only voice permitted to
speak that memory is the subject to whom it belongs, to the exclusion of
the therapeutic discourse that produced it.
Under the banner of "common sense," psychological truth has become
part of modern legal truth. The Supreme Court's confession jurisprudence,
which Brooks has made the subject of a recent book,101 includes many
psychological presumptions about what motivates subjects to confess, but
almost no serious discussion of the status of those theories in psychology
or its fellow psy-discourses. In place of critical dialogue between legal and
psy-expertise, there has been a series of largely metaphorical
99. NIKOLAS ROSE, INVENTING OURSELVES: PSYCHOLOGY, POWER, AND PERSONHOOD (1996).
100. Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound. An Essay on
Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995).
101. PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS (2000).
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appropriations akin to those made by Dimock's academic legal theorists.
This method of appropriation leaves law peculiarly vulnerable to cultural
infection by discourses that it cannot recognize as distinctive or potentially
invasive. While Brooks does not provide the kind of historical
examination suggested by Dimock, his discussion of confessions registers
the receding role of the empirical social sciences that Greenhouse invoked
with her "pragmatism of reform." Brooks's warning that producers of
cultural analysis of law should attend to how law appropriates outside
analysis recalls Greenhouse's appeal for a critical engagement of social
science and law with neo-liberalism.
Each of the essays in the last section-Reading Legal Events-focuses
on moments of judgment, moments in which law is asked to understand
the world beyond its boundaries. Each shows law's dependence on a series
of unacknowledged aesthetic, psychological, historical, and cultural
assumptions. Each also reveals the power of law to produce forms of
subjectivity and moments of truth, and uses the techniques of cultural
analysis and cultural studies to decode and critique the assumptions and
pathways of power.
Shoshana Felman revisits one of the most contested moments of post-
World War II legality, the 1957 trial of Holocaust administrator Adolph
Eichmann. Her essay focuses on a particularly searing moment in that trial
(which was one of the first trials to be televised): the collapse of a
prosecution witness while on the stand. The witness was Auschwitz
survivor and author Yehiel Dinoor, better known by the German slang
term meaning concentration camp inmate-K-Zetnik. K-Zetnik was only
one of many survivors to take the stand and attempt to describe the
Holocaust directly from the perspective of the victims, but, as Felman
points out, he was also one of the few survivors whose testimony was
directly relevant to Eichmann's relationship to Auschwitz. His testimony
had only barely begun when, in response to a set of preliminary questions
about his name, K-Zetnik went into a trance-like state and fainted on the
stand. He had a paralytic stroke, which kept him near death in a hospital
for more than two weeks.
On one level, Felman raises a question similar to that posed by
Brooks-namely, how does the law respond to the trauma of violence and
recovered memory? On another level, Felman shows us a different face of
law's relationship to trauma. Here the trauma is on a scale beyond
comprehension, and the problem of recovery is less one of personal recall
than of the capacity to communicate the truth of an historical event.
Whereas Brooks's judges were mainly concerned to normalize the
testimony of recovered memory and reduce it to a legally managed fact,
the Eichmann trial, including the prosecutors and judge, sought to produce
the emotional truth of the Holocaust through its survivors. At the same
time, law's demand for tight control of other discourses set real limits on
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the terms in which the emotion of trauma could speak. Felman ultimately
reads K-Zetnik's collapse as evidence both of these limits and of the kinds
of sacrifice it takes to transcend them.
While in Brooks's account the battle is primarily between the law of
evidence and the knowledge that therapy produces about recovered
memory, the response to the Holocaust demonstrates the multiple ways
that law can relate to the production of such memories. The Eichmann
trial, with its deliberate invocation of the voices of the survivors, was a
striking contrast to the approach taken at the 1945 trial of Nazi officers
conducted by the Allies in the German city of Nuremberg. The Nuremberg
prosecutors, led by the American lawyers, chose to put on a documentary
case, which left the survivors' voices out of the evidence. In contrast, the
Eichmann trial was quite explicitly aimed at producing survivor testimony
of the Holocaust. This strategy carried real risks of failure and
delegitimation.
From this perspective, K-Zetnik's collapse marks a moment when the
narrative needs of law, especially the temporality that requires locating an
event in the past, ran up against the explosive presentness of trauma to the
victims. °2 Trials like Eichmann's revolve around the production of
memories and the conversion of personal suffering into national memory.
While legal theory has prioritized the difficulties of the judgments made at
both the Nuremberg and the Eichmann trials, Felman's account reminds us
that the moments of memory that lie behind judgment place law in far
more jeopardy than somewhat abstract "legitimation crises" alone. K-
Zetnik's collapse, broadcast repeatedly over the years, produced its own
cultural truth. In the end, Felman argues, the Eichmann trial succeeded not
in spite of, but because of its failures. The witness's inability to testify
allowed the muteness at the center of the Holocaust's horror to exist
within law but also as legal art.
102. Felman reads K-zetnik's collapse and its legal meaning both with and against a portion of
Hannah Arendt's legendary critique of the Eichmann trial, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON
THE BANALITY OF EvIL (1967). Felman takes the opportunity to read the event through the genealogy
of Arendt's earlier work, which sought to use the trials as a window into the relationship between law
and evil. Arendt was highly critical of the prosecution's approach to the Eichmann case, which she
regarded as in many respects a "show trial." Arendt pays specific attention to K-Zetnik's collapse,
which she turns into a metaphor for the wages of producing the truth of the Holocaust through its
victims.
Reading Arendt psychoanalytically, Felman traces her harsh repression of the voice of the victim to
Arendt's own grief for her friend Walter Benjamin's suicide while in custody at the Spanish border.
Benjamin was truly a victim of the banality of evil. The custody that Benjamin despaired of escaping
was little more than bureaucratic bad luck at the border. By insisting that only law govern the meaning
of the Holocaust, and that law avoid the risks of inviting the remembrance of violence, Arendt was
excluding from the interpretation of the Holocaust what her friend Benjamin had prophetically
described as the "expressionless." Benjamin thought that the ability to give voice to a sense of trauma
depended on a context shared between speaker and listener that was broad enough to encompass the
trauma. Felman's analysis of Arendt reminds us that the power of law to transform the cultural
meaning of events and memories-including its ability to demythologize evil-can be a political
choice as opposed to simply an inevitable expansion of law, or a strategy of the most powerful.
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Like Felman, Anthony Paul Farley is interested in finding ways to talk
about haunting absences in legal events. In his contribution, he explores
the representations that haunt the Supreme Court's recent efforts to define
the role of racial identity in the construction of constitutionally adequate
voting districts. In striking down a number of black majority districts, the
court has emphasized seemingly neutral concerns like compactness, but
has inched precariously close to articulating a notion of whiteness that
underlies the body politic of the United States. Drawing on the
psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan, Farley probes the cultural
penumbra of the implicit legal question at issue in most of these
challenges: How are white people harmed when they are represented by
blacks? The answer lies not in the legal position of the parties, but in the
enduring threat that the black body poses to the imaginary coherence and
power of the white body politic.
What Farley uncovers is a powerful cultural investment in black bodies
as the negated bond holding white communities together. While notions of
racial community are denigrated by official discourse of all sorts,
especially Supreme Court opinions, Farley finds explosive symbolic links
between the Court's metaphysical reasoning about the shape of voting
districts and the physical torture and dismemberment of blacks in the
rituals of lynching. The Court's repugnance toward oddly shaped districts
has reflected a displacement of the white community's enthusiasm for the
hideous shapes produced by lynching, while the Court's judgment has
reaffirmed the central role of race in defining political community in the
United States.
The final essay, by Alison Young, continues Farley's interest in the
nature of legal judgment, its absences, and its haunting specters. Young
uses HIV, and the legal cases and artistic images it generates, to
interrogate the meaning of legal judgment. Young first shows how, in a
variety of cases arising from attacks on gay men or efforts to expel them
from the military, law depends on what she calls an "aesthetics of
appearance." In these cases, law relies on the visual force of phantasy.
Sometimes phantasies of abuse are used to make sense of a violent attack
on a gay man; sometimes phantasies of blood uncontrollably spilling forth
are used to justify removal of an H1V-positive soldier from military
service. Through these imaginings, gay men are subject to community
values in a way that denies them a place in the community or devalues the
place that they occupy.
Young turns to art and film in order to explore the "aesthetics of
disappearance." These cultural artifacts refigure the image, turning it from
a device that severs relations into a bridge that connects viewers to the
bodies of gay men with HIV. Young reads various works of Felix
Gonzalez-Torres, an artist who died of AIDS in 1996. These works-piles
of paper, spills of candy, fabric blowing in the wind-suggest processes of
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motion, disappearance, and loss. Viewers, Young argues, are invited to
both witness and participate in these moments. We are connected to, not
severed from, the suffering of embodied, but disappearing beings. We are
brought to respect alterity through a framework of judgment that brings
self and other into a proximate relationship.
In Derek Jarmen's film Blue, the image does not move. The camera
stays fixed on a cobalt blue background as viewers hear voices, sounds,
bells, poems. Jarmen, who at the time he made this film was losing his
eyesight to AIDS, captures and makes literal the difficulty of representing
HIV-a difficulty never acknowledged in the legal cases that Young
describes. In those cases visual realism leads to a failure in legal judgment
at both the aesthetic and moral levels. "The written texts of law," Young
suggests, "reconstruct the event (the 'real') of HIV in the order of vision,
where judgment is governed by the desire to see, and in 'seeing,' to have
done with HIV." For Young, cultural studies speaks to this failure by
providing a different way of reading images and a different scene of
judgment, one that can take account of the fragmented, suffering, fleshy
body and help "the eye of the law... [to] flicker from the mark to the pain
of the other in law [by] subjecting the legal and the living to the horizon of
deathbound subjectivity."
In these varied readings of legal events and of the flow of legal ideas
into and through culture, we encounter accounts, sometimes explicit,
sometimes implicit, of the power and possibilities of cultural analysis and
cultural studies described in the first section of this Introduction. Even as
they insistently attend to the cultural basis and operation of law, they do
not display the type of reduction of the social to the cultural that marks the
politics of our era. They call us to attend to the cultural, not for its
recuperative or redemptive potential, but instead to expose the layers of
power that the turn to culture in the political realm often seeks to mask.
They call us to the cultural as a point of departure for a critique of the
epistemology and ethics that today hold out culture as an explanation and
a cure for problems that cannot in truth be addressed through culture itself.
In the end, these readings, like the legal realism of the past, remind us that
legal scholarship can be both critical and transformative.
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